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Abstract
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Deposit  insurance  and  bank  failure  resolution  are  important  parts of the  financial
safety  net and an  incentive  compatible  design of both can  minimize  the probability
and cost of financial fragility. The absence of explicit deposit insurance or the proper
design of an explicit  scheme can encourage  large depositors  and creditors to monitor
banks and exert market discipline,  thus reducing the risk of aggressive risk taking by
banks and thus the risk of financial fragility. Effective  and timely resolution of failed
banks can decrease  the cost that  bank failures  can  cause  to the banking system.  An
incentive-compatible  design  of bank  failure  resolution  can contain  aggressive  risk-
taking by banks and thus reduce the probability of bank failures ex-ante.
The  financial  safety  net has  opposing  public  policy  objectives.  On the  one
hand,  it  is  supposed  to  protect small  depositors,  prevent  bank  runs  and the  break-
down of financial  intermediation.  On the other hand,  a financial  safety net has to be
designed  so that  it  minimizes  aggressive  risk-taking  by banks,  which  can  result  in
financial  fragility. To understand these opposing public policy objectives,  one has to
consider the incentives of the major participants  in the financial safety net;
(i) bank management and owners,
(ii) depositors and other creditors,
(iii) the managers of the financial safety net and
(iv) the owners of  the financial safety net (ultimately the tax payer);
see Kane  (2000).  Given the  put-option  character of bank  equity,  bank  shareholders
participate  only  in  the up-side  risk  of the bank  business and  have therefore  strong
incentives to take too aggressive risks, ignoring sound and prudent risk management.
Effective  bank regulation  and supervision, as well  as market discipline  exercised  by
large depositors and creditors can keep banks in check.
The existence  and design  of deposit insurance  and the effectiveness  of bank
failure  resolution  can  have profound  impact  on market  discipline.  Depositors  care
mostly  about  the  safety  of their  deposits.  A  generous  deposit  insurance  scheme
decreases  incentives  to exert market  discipline,  even  of large  depositors  and  other
creditors  that  are  not  covered,  if the  introduction  of deposit  insurance  signals  the
authorities'  willingness  to  bail  out  all  creditors  in  the  case  of bank  failure.  The
owners of the financial safety net, often and,  in its ultimate consequences,  always the
taxpayers, want to minimize  its costs,  while  its managers  might have other interests
2and  time  horizons  and  might  represent  the  interests  of specific  groups,  such  as
politicians and banks.
While  both  deposit  insurance  and  bank  failure  resolution  are  important  in
minimizing the risk of financial  fragility, the proper functioning of each depends on
the  proper functioning  of the  other and  the overall  safety  net.  A deposit  insurance
scheme  can  maintain  market  discipline  and  minimize  moral  hazard  risk  only  if
accompanied  by efficient and timely resolution of failed banks  upon market signals
of distress.  A  poorly  designed  deposit  insurance  scheme  can  increase  financial
fragility  by giving  banks  perverse  incentives  and thus overload  even  an efficiently
working bank failure resolution  scheme.
While  not all  countries  have  explicit  deposit  insurance  schemes  and  bank
failure  resolution  systems,  both  components  of the  financial  safety  net are  almost
always  present.  Unless  explicitly  excluded  by  law,  depositors  often  perceive  the
existence of implicit deposit insurance,  especially  for government  and too-large-to-
close banks. Even in the absence of a formal institutional  structure to resolve  failing
banks, authorities  are  forced  to address bank  fragility.  Perhaps  paradoxically,  even
the  complete  lack  of addressing  failing  banks  constitutes  a  sort  of bank  failure
resolution, though certainly not the most incentive-compatible one.
This  paper discusses  the  incentive-compatible  design  of deposit  insurance,
bank failure  resolution and their potential  interactions and presents and compares the
financial  safety  net arrangements  in three countries;  Germany,  Brzil and Russia.'
While  recent  empirical  cross-country  studies  have  evaluated  the  effect  of deposit
insurance on market discipline,  financial fragility and financial development, country
case.  studies  can  complement  them  by  providing  valuable  insights  into  the
institutional  features of the safety net and the interaction  of its different components.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the incentive
compatible  design  of  deposit  insurance  schemes  and  empirical  cross-country
evidence on its effect on banking system  stability.  Section 3 discusses  the incentive-
compatible  design of bank failure resolution schemes and its interaction with deposit
insurance.  Section 4 describes  and compares the financial safety net arrangements  in
Germany,  Brazil and Russia and Section 5  concludes.
32. Deposit Insurance
This section  discusses  the  incentive  compatible  design  of deposit  insurance
schemes  and  summarizes  the  results  of the  recent  cross-country  literature  on  the
effects of deposit insurance on market discipline and financial fragility.2
2.1. Deposit Insurance  - Conceptual  Ideas
Deposit  insurance  schemes  are  asked  to  fulfill  conflicting  public-policy
objectives:  on the one hand,  they are supposed to protect small depositors and ensure
financial  stability,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  supposed  to  minimize  banks'
incentives  to take  aggressive  risks.  While  establishing  a  deposit  insurance  scheme
can promote  bank stability  by preventing  bank runs,  it is also  a potential  source of
moral hazard.  Banks can transfer some of the  downside  risk of their business to the
owners  of the  deposit  insurance  scheme,  often  the  taxpayer.  Risk-shifting  can
become  so  substantial  that  rather than promoting  bank stability,  deposit insurance
increases  bank fragility.
To understand the risks of deposit insurance,  one has to consider the incentive
structure  of bankers.  Given  the  put-option  character  of bank  equity,  bankers  face
strong incentives to lend aggressively,  ignoring prudent risk management.  The lower
their capital  base,  the  less they  have  to  lose  and  the  more  they  can  gain  through
aggressive  lending.  Market  discipline  exerted  by  creditors  and  regulatory  and
supervisory  discipline  from  the  authorities can  help reduce  this form of aggressive
risk  taking.  Bank  creditors  can  withdraw  funds  or  demand  a  risk  premium  if
observing a decline  in banks'  liquidity and solvency.  Large creditors and depositors,
such  as other banks or nonfinancial  enterprises,  have  the capacity to follow closely
the  banks  they  entrust  with  their deposits.  Since  small  depositors  do  not have  the
ability or incentives to monitor banks  carefully, they rely on a strong  regulatory and
supervisory  authority,  which is willing to take prompt action against weak banks, or
free-ride on the efforts of large creditors.
There  are  several  risks  inherent  in  a  deposit  insurance  scheme.  By
encouraging  the  confidence  of depositors  in  the  safety  of their  deposits,  they  can
make  depositors  complacent  and  decrease  their  incentives  to  monitor  banks.
Especially  the  large  depositors, that are  the  most  likely and  most  able to monitor
banks,  might  reduce  their  efforts,  if they  perceive  the  introduction  of a  deposit
insurance  scheme  for small depositors as a signal that the coverage will be extended
4to  them  in  times  of crisis.  The  existence  of a  deposit  insurance  scheme  and  the
resulting  reduced  market discipline can also change  the incentive  structure  for bank
owners and managers.  In the presence of insured deposits, a low capital base reduces
the  downside  of risk  even  more  and,  when  hit  by  a  negative  shock,  a  bank  is
therefore  more likely to take  large aggressive  risks. Generous  deposit insurance  has
thus the effect of subsidizing this aggressive risk-taking.
Several  features  of explicit  deposit  insurance  can  make  it  more  incentive
compatible,  decreasing moral  hazard and agency costs.  One such feature is to assign
a margin of loss to  private  parties to  force  them to monitor banks  and  so  increase
market  discipline.  It  is  desirable to  identify  a group that is able  and  likely to  exert
market  discipline  when  forced  to  do  so.  Limited  coverage  makes  the  insurance
incomplete,  and  forces  large  depositors  to  monitor  banks.  Similarly,  coinsurance
forces  at  least  some  depositors  to  bear  a  certain  share  of losses,  since  they  are
reimbursed  for less than  100% of their deposits.  Excluding  interbank  deposits  from
the insurance  forces  banks  to monitor and discipline  one another.  Excluding  insider
deposits  (i.e.  the  accounts  of management  and  influential  owners)  reduces  moral
hazard by making owners and  managers  participate personally  in the downside  risk
of the bank business.
A second feature is to structure the management and funding of the scheme in
an incentive  compatible way.  Industry-based  funding and management  can decrease
agency  problems  between  owners  and  managers  of the  deposit  insurance  scheme.
Funding of the deposit  insurance  scheme  through premiums  levied  on the member
banks makes  banks pay for the risks they take  and thus reduces  their incentives  to
take  aggressive  risks,  thereby  abusing  the  insurance  scheme.  Management  by the
banks can further reduce incentive problems; the member banks do not only have the
capacity  to  monitor  each  other,  they  have  also  the  strongest  incentives  to  avoid
insurance  losses,  especially  if  they  have  to  pay  for  these  losses.  A  complete
privatization,  however,  might not be possible,  as we will discuss in the next section.
Finally, mandatory membership or strong  incentives to belong to a deposit insurance
scheme  are  important  to  avoid  adverse  selection,  with  strong  banks  leaving  the
scheme  in order to avoid cross-subsidization of weak banks.
Not only the source  of funding,  but also  its correct  level is  important.3 The
adequate  pricing  of premiums  assessed  on  member  banks  not  only  ensures  the
viability of the fund, but also reduces moral hazard risks by making banks pay for the
5risks they are taking. Finally,  it shows openly the cost of deposit insurance.  One step
further  is the application  of differential  premiums depending  on the risks banks are
taking and are therefore posing to the  scheme. While  theoretically superior to a flat
premium,  which  implies cross-subsidies  from  less  risky  to more  risky  banks,  risk-
based  premiums  are  difficult  to  implement  in  reality,  due  to  severe  information
problems.  Rather  than  a  perfect  risk-premium  match,  banks  are  therefore  often
assigned to risk buckets.
While  industry-based  funding  is  more  incentive-compatible  than  public
funding, the accumulation  of liquid resources  is not only inefficient but also risky in
weak  institutional  environments,  where  large  'pots  of  money'  invite  abuse  and
looting.  While  insufficient resources  in the deposit insurance  fund might undermine
depositors'  confidence  in the scheme  and prevent  authorities from closing unviable
banks,  sufficient  funds  can  be  ensured  by  giving  the  deposit  insurer  access  to
contingent  financing,  either  from  the market  or  the  government.  This  additional
financing can then be repaid by additional  premiums levied on the surviving banks.
While  a  proper  design  of an  explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  along  the
different dimensions  can  minimize  moral  hazard  risk and  thus the  risk of financial
fragility,  the  interaction  of these  design  features  is  as  important.  Industry-based
funding  and  management  are  important  complements.  Industry-based  funding  and
public  management of the  scheme  can make  the  deposit  insurance  fund subject to
political  capture  and  looting  by  politicians.  Public  funding  and  industry-based
management  subjects the fund to the risk of looting  by the banking system. Further,
industry-based  management  of the  deposit  insurance  should be  complemented  by
some  role  for the  deposit  insurer  in the  regulation  and  supervision  of the member
banks.  While  this  does  not  imply  having  a  parallel  supervisory  structure,  which
would be too costly for many developing countries, certain supervisory powers of the
deposit insurer can enhance significantly the market discipline. This can include
(i) mandatory participation  in the licensing process,
(ii)  the  right  to  request  extraordinary  audits  of banks  that  it perceives  as
unsound,  and
(iii)  the  power  to  exclude  member  banks  that  it perceives  to  be  recklessly
managed.
While  the  latter  especially  might  be  a  'nuclear  bomb'  never  used,  it  can  have
4 sufficiently strong deterring power.
62.2. Deposit  Insurance  - Cross-Country  Evidence
While the risks and benefits  of deposit insurance  have been discussed  extensively  in
the  literature,  until  recently  there was  no  empirical  cross-country  evidence  on  the
relative  weights  of  the  risks  and  benefits  of  introducing  deposit  insurance  and
specific  design  features.  A recent data compilation  has allowed to  assess the effects
of  deposit  insurance  on  market  discipline,  financial  fragility  and  financial
development  (Demirgil9-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001).
Recent  cross-country  comparisons  have shown the risks of adopting explicit
deposit insurance schemes. The likelihood of a banking crisis tends to increase  in the
presence  of  a  poorly  designed  deposit  insurance  scheme  (DemirgU$-Kunt  and
Detriagache,  2003).  The  likelihood  is  even  greater  in countries  with  deregulated
interest  rates  and  an  institutional  environment  that  lacks  transparency.  The  US
savings and loan crisis of the  1980s has been widely explained by the coexistence  of
a  generous  deposit  insurance  scheme,  financial  liberalization,  and  the  failure  of
regulators to intervene  promptly in failing institutions.5
Recent  empirical research has shown that specific design features, such as the
coverage  and the  funding of a deposit insurance  scheme  are related with its success
in  terms  of preventing  bank runs  and  providing  small  depositor  protection,  while
maintaining  market  discipline  and  avoiding  aggressive  risk  taking  by  banks  that
would result in banking  crises.  DemirgUc-Kunt and Huizinga  (1999)  find that higher
explicit  coverage  and  having  a  funded  scheme  reduce  market  discipline,  i.e.  the
sensitivity of the deposit  interest rate the bank has to  pay to  changes  in profits  and
liquidity  ratios.  DemirgtUc-Kunt  and  Detragiache  (2003)  likewise  find  that  the
probability of having a banking crisis increases  in the coverage  limit and in having a
funded  scheme.  They also  find that in countries  with  more  efficient  institutions  the
moral  hazard  problems  stemming  from  explicit  deposit  insurance  and  some  of its
characteristics  are  lower  or  non-existent.  This  raises  the  importance  of  country-
specific approaches to deposit insurance  schemes, taking into account other elements
of the  safety  net and  the institutional  environment.  Finally,  Cull,  Senbet and  Sorge
(2001)  find a  significantly  negative  impact  of a poorly  designed  deposit  insurance
scheme on financial development.
The pricing of deposit insurance  schemes has also been found to be  important
for  their  effect  on banks'  risk-taking  behavior.  Laeven  (2002b)  shows  that  most
7deposit  insurance  schemes  are  not  properly  priced.  Using  different  methods  of
calculating  the actuarially  fair deposit insurance  premium,  reflecting the risk banks
take,  Laeven finds that many  countries do not charge  their banks the actuarially fair
premium,  implying  a subsidization  of risks  banks  are  taking.  Hovakimnian  et  al.
(2002)  show that risk  shifting  to the  government  or  subsidization  of risk taking  is
stronger  in  poor  institutional  environments  but  can  be  reduced  with  an  incentive-
compatible design.
Cross-country  evidence  on  the  effects  of  deposit  insurance  has  been
augmented  by  country  studies.  A  large  literature  discusses  success  stories  and
failures of state-level deposit insurance schemes  in the US.6 The successful examples
functioned  mostly  like  clubs,  had  strong  regulatory  and  supervisory  powers  over
their members  and exit from the scheme  was hard or even  impossible.  Furthermore,
advantages of belonging to the 'club' included  liquidity support in times of crisis. A
small number of members and unlimited mutual liability prevented free riding on the
collective  insurance.
3. Bank Failure Resolution  and Its Interaction with Deposit
Insurance
This  section  discusses  the  incentive  compatible  design  of  bank  failure
resolution  systems  and  its interaction  with deposit  insurance  schemes.  Underlying
non-systemic  bank  failure  resolution  is  the  objective  of protecting  the  banking
system, but not the individual  bank.  To the contrary,  the organized and effective exit
of banks is as much part of an efficient banking system as the entry of new banks.
3.1. Bank Failure  Resolution - Conceptual  Ideas 7
As  deposit  insurance,  bank  failure  resolution  has  two  conflicting  public-
policy objectives.  On the one hand,  it has the task of minimizing the disruption  and
cost of failing banks  by providing for their  efficient and timely exit. This includes
minimizing the risk of contagion that might arise  from individual bank  failures. On
the  other  hand,  the  incentive-compatible  design  of  bank  failure  resolution  is
important  to minimize  aggressive  risk-taking by  banks.  If bankers  know that they
face immediate  exit combined with the immediate and complete  loss of all equity in
the case of insolvency,  they are  less willing to take aggressive  risks. If depositors andcreditors  know that they will suffer losses  in the  case of bank failure,  they will  be
more  willing to exert market  discipline.  If, on the  other hand,  the  authorities  give
shareholders  and creditors the opportunity  to shift risk to the taxpayer,  by providing
for generous  bail-outs and late intervention and closure, this increases  incentives for
aggressive  risk taking  and increases  the probability  and extent of financial  fragility.
As in the case of deposit insurance,  bank failure resolution has thus to be designed to
avoid problems of moral hazard - aggressive  risk taking by banks - principal-agent
problems between managers and owners of the system and adverse selection between
banks.
In  order  to  provide  for  a  quick  and  timely  exit  of failing  banks,  while
minimizing the  risk of contagion and disruption to the  financial  sector,  bank failure
resolution has to address two major  problems that correspond to the two  sides of a
bank's  balance  sheet.  First,  in  order  to  maintain  debtor  discipline  and access  to
credit, as well as the information value of an ongoing credit relationship,  performing
loans  should be  kept within the  financial  system and  not be liquidated.  Second,  an
interruption of the access that depositors  have to their savings in the failed bank, can
cause  contagion  and runs  on other,  fundamentally  sound, banks.  In the  Argentine
context,  these two problems have  been also referred  to as refrigeration  and hostage
problems;  efficient  bank  failure  resolution  wants  to  avoid  that "perishable  assets"
leave  the refrigerator,  i.e. the  banking  system,  and  wants to "take the  hostages,  i.e.
the depositors, out" first.  Minimizing the risk of contagion and asset decay demands
solutions other than liquidation of the bank, since liquidation of banks implies
(i) closure of bank, thus blocking access of depositors  to their savings, and
(ii) loss of incentives for bank management to maintain debtor discipline.
Even  in the most  efficient judicial  systems,  a liquidation  is therefore  often not the
most efficient resolution mechanism.
Alternatives  to  liquidation  include  private  sector  solutions,  such  as merger
and  acquisition,  and  mixed  private-public  sector  solutions  such  as  purchase  and
assumption techniques.  While private  sector solutions do not involve  any public or
deposit  insurance  resources,  moral  suasion  and  other  active  participation  by
supervisors  or other  financial  safety net  agents  might  be  necessary  to bring about
such  a  solution.  A  purchase  and  assumption  implies  the  transfer  of assets  and
preferred  liabilities  to other  financial  institutions,  before revoking  a bank's license.
Only impaired  assets are left in the failing banks, together with certain  liabilities, and
9are subject to liquidation.  A rapidly performed  purchase and assumption transaction
can  minimize  both the  risks of contagion,  since depositors  will lack  access to their
funds only for a short,  if any, time period, and of asset decay,  especially since most
credits  do not leave the  financial  system.8 If done  in time, before assets  fall  below
liabilities,  a completely  private solution can be envisioned. If the 'good' assets are not
sufficient  to  cover  the  liabilities  that  the  authorities  want  to  transfer,  additional
resources are required, either from a deposit insurance fund or public resources.
Bank failure resolution,  however,  also has the task of minimizing aggressive
risk-taking  ex-ante  and  thus  reducing  financial  fragility.  Specifically,  it  can  be
designed  in a way to minimize moral hazard risk ex-ante and distribute  the costs of
bank  failure  in  a  fair  way  ex-post.  First,  an  incentive-compatible  distribution  of
losses  should  be  made  clear  ex-ante  and  strictly  observed  ex-post.  Shareholders
should be the first ones to suffer losses by seeing their equity wiped out. Incentives
of shareholders can be further improved by making them liable for losses beyond the
level of the paid-in capital.9 This would make stock prices  more sensitive to changes
in underlying  bank fundamentals  and have shareholders  participate more fully  in the
downside  risk.  Finally,  subordinated  debt  can  be  used  to  create  a  class of debt
holders  required  to  take  the  first  hit.  The  holders  of subordinated  debt  would
therefore have a strong incentive to monitor banks and exercise market discipline.'0
Second,  intervention  in  a  failing  bank -should  be  timely,  preferably  well
before  assets fall  below liabilities. This is especially  important  since,  as discussed in
Section  2,  incentives  for aggressive  risk-taking  increase  as the  capital falls towards
zero.  Further,  timely  intervention  and resolution  also  avoids distortionary  effects  on
bank competition  by failing  banks'  attempts  to  attract  additional  deposit  resources
through higher  rates,  extend  aggressively  their  lending portfolio  and their negative
effects  on  borrower  discipline.  Avoiding  moral  hazard  risk  also  speaks  against
resolution  techniques  that  involve  a  bailout  of  banks  with  public  resources  or
regulatory forbearance  to enable the bank to recover a sound capital base.
The  institutional  structure  of bank  failure  resolution  can  be  designed  in  an
incentive  compatible  way,  by  assigning  the  responsibility  of  intervening  and
resolving  to  the  agent  with  the  highest  incentives  to  minimize  losses.  Bank
supervisors  often  have  the  best  information  for  intervening  early  and  resolving
troubled  banks.  The  ability  to  intervene  also  strengthens  their  power  vis-a-vis  the
banks  in their supervision (Quintyn and Taylor,  2002).  Bank  supervisors,  however,
10do  not  always  have  good  incentives  to  intervene  in  banks,  but  rather  to  avoid
intervening  during their tenure  (Kane,  1990).  Reputational  concerns  might prevent
them  from  intervening  early  (Boot  and  Thakor,  1993).  Political  pressure  and
regulatory  capture,  together  with  personal  liability  can  prevent  supervisors  from
intervening.  The  deposit  insurance  agency  might  have  appropriate  incentives  to
intervene  but  most  likely,  only  if managed  and  at  least  partially  funded  by  the
banking industry, and thus with strong incentives  to minimize losses. Finally,  even if
the  formal  authority  rests  with  supervisory  or  regulatory  authorities,  the  private
sector, especially other banks,  is often  involved in the resolution,  since it often has at
least complementary  if not even better  information  about troubled  banks  than  bank
supervisors,  and  strong  incentives  to  intervene  early."' Merger  and acquisition  and
purchase  and  assumption  techniques,  described  above,  imply  the  involvement  of
other banks  in the  resolution of a troubled  bank, most  likely under the guidance  of
bank supervisory authorities.  The involvement of other banks and a deposit insurance
scheme  financed  by banks  can also  help  reduce  principal-agent  problems  between
owners and managers of a bank failure resolution  scheme and the banks themselves.
There  are parallels  between  incentive-compatible  design  features  of deposit
insurance  and  incentive-compatible  design  features  of  bank  failure  resolution.
Deposits of insiders, such as senior management  and controlling shareholders  should
be excluded from  deposit insurance coverage; the same groups should be among the
last  to receive  compensation  in bank  failure  resolution.  Deposit  insurance  aims  at
protecting  small  depositors,  by  setting  a  coverage  limit.  Similarly,  bank  failure
resolution  can  include  priority  ranking  for  small  depositors in liquidation  and the
transfer of deposits only up to a certain limit in a purchase and assumption  model.
3.2. The Interaction  of  Bank Failure  Resolution and  Deposit Insurance
Both  deposit  insurance  and  bank  failure  resolution  are  subject  to  the  trade-off
between  two  conflicting  public-policy  objectives.  On  the  one  hand,  they  are
supposed  to provide  financial  stability  and  protect  small  depositors.  On  the  other
hand, they have to minimize aggressive risk taking and avoid moral hazard. In order
to strike the right balance between both objectives,  both components of the financial
safety  net have to  be  consistent with each other and other  components of the safety
net, such as supervision  and  lender-of-last  resort facilities.  An incentive  compatible
deposit insurance  scheme that ensures  monitoring  by large  depositors  and creditors,
11has  to be  accompanied  by a bank failure  resolution  system that does  intervene  and
close  banks  when  the  markets  signal  fragility.  While  large  depositors  can  exert
market discipline, a bailout of bank owners minimizes the effect of this discipline.  A
bank  failure  system  that  provides  implicit  deposit  insurance  for all  depositors,  not
just small  ones, can undermine the market discipline imposed  by the explicit deposit
insurance  scheme.  The insurance  losses of deposit insurance  can be minimized  by an
efficient bank  failure resolution  system that does not only allow for liquidation,  but
alternative resolution.
Consistency with other components of the financial  safety net is as important.
Unlimited  access of failing  banks to  lender-of-last-resort  facilities can give perverse
incentives  to supervisors  to grant regulatory forbearance  in order to avoid recognition
of substantial  losses  to  the  authorities  in  charge  of lender-of-last-resort  facilities.
Efficient bank  failure  resolution  and incentive-compatible  deposit insurance require
effective supervision to
(i)  enable early intervention, thus minimizing resolution costs and
(ii) compensate  for the partial loss of market discipline that deposit insurance
implies.
Finally,  private  agents  do  not  only  need  incentives,  but  also  the  instruments  to
monitor banks.'2
The technique of purchase and  assumption together with  implicit or explicit
deposit  insurance  exemplifies  this  trade-off  between  conflicting  public-policy
objectives of the financial  safety net.  While contagion concerns might speak in favor
of transferring  a large amount of deposits to other financial institutions, moral hazard
considerations  would favor a strict limitation. While the coverage  limit should be set
sufficiently low to enhance market discipline, an efficient application of the purchase
and assumption technique requires  a certain minimum of deposits to be transferred to
the  new  bank.  In  order  to  avoid  moral  hazard  in  the  context  of a  purchase  and
assumption  mechanism,  one  can  apply the  least cost  criterion,  which  requires  the
technique to be applied that implies the lowest cost for the government  or the deposit
insurer.  This  would  imply  that  any  solution  other  than  liquidation  would  have  to
incur costs  less  than the cost of paying out insured  deposits minus  recoveries.  This
would  in most cases restrict the transfer of non-deposit creditors and shareholders. 13
Another  element  to  improve  market  discipline  is  to  statutorily  limit the  liabilities
than can be transferred to the good bank.
12Applying the least cost criterion,  however, faces several problems.  First, only
estimates  are  available  about  potential  asset  recoveries  and  the cost  of a potential
liquidation.  Second, cost calculations do typically not take into account effects of the
chosen resolution  method  on the behavior of borrowers  and depositors,  on the  one
side, and the behavior of other banks,  on the other side.  Failure resolution  resulting
in  asset  decay  and  depositor  run  increases  overall  failure  resolution  costs.  Failure
resolution  that creates  perverse  incentives  for  other banks  to  take  aggressive  risk
might ultimately increase resolution costs of other failing banks.  Resolution methods
with  seemingly  low  short-term  costs  might thus results  in  large  long-term  costs  if
substantially increasing contagion or moral hazard risks.
The chosen  balance between the stability  and the moral hazard objectives of
the financial  safety net might vary with the size of the bank. Specifically,  in the case
of banks  that  are  considered  to  be too  big  to  close,  public-policy  considerations
might  override  financial  considerations  of the  least-cost criterion  discussed  so  far.
The economic cost calculation, in terms of financial stability,  and other criteria, such
as access to finance  issues,  might tip the balance  in favor of resolution mechanisms
that  are  not  optimal  from  the  viewpoint  of avoiding  moral  hazard  and  from  the
financial  standpoint  of  the  deposit  insurer.  This  includes  open-bank  assistance;
injection  of  public  resources  in  the  form  of  debt,  equity  or  purchase  of  non-
performing  assets,  while the  bank stays  open for  business.  This can  come with  or
without direct managerial  involvement by the authorities.
Open-bank  assistance  poses considerable  incentive  and  agency  problems  as
well  as legal and financial  risk for the government.  If the existing  management  and
ownership  structure  is kept  in place,  risk-taking  decisions  are  taken  by agents  that
have  little  or  no more  downside  risk  and  thus  large  incentives  to take  aggressive
risks.  This  poses  considerable  challenges  to  bank  supervisors  to  control  such
aggressive  risk taking.  If management of the  bank is taken  over by authorities,  the
deficiencies  of government  ownership  of banks  are  often  revealed.  Cross-country
experience has shown the risks of such open-bank assistance: many intervened banks
had to be liquidated  at the end, with the financial cost being higher than if the bank
had  been  closed  earlier.  Finally,  special  treatment  for  large  banks  creates  adverse
selection  problems  since  banks  are  treated  differently  depending  on  their  size.
Nevertheless,  macroeconomic  and  political  considerations  often  override  this
13negative  experience.  This  raises  issues  concerning  the  predictability  of  such  a
situation and the involvement of an explicit deposit insurance  scheme.
Overriding  established  rules  of the  financial  safety  net  by  public-policy
considerations  in the case of too-big-to-close  banks can be done on an ad-hoc  basis,
with  the  event being  unpredictable,  or by  establishing  specific  rules  of the  game,
such as in the US.  As in the case of deposit insurance,  the optimal choice  might very
much  depend  on the institutional  development  of a country.  While  explicit  deposit
insurance and specific  rules for open-bank assistance  might be preferable  in a strong
legal  and  institutional  environment,  the ambiguity  of an  implicit deposit  insurance
scheme  and  discretion  in  open-bank  assistance  might  be  optimal  in  a  weak
institutional environment.
While  public-policy  considerations  might  override  microeconomic
considerations,  deposit insurance  funds should not be used  for open-bank assistance.
If deposit  insurance  is financed  by  the  banking  industry,  its  use  for  open-bank
assistance  would  clearly  constitute  a  case  of political  abuse.  Further,  a  political
decision  to  keep  a  failing  bank  open,  should  be  accompanied  by  funding  on  the
political  level,  i.e. the general  budget.  This  would also  increase  the transparency  of
the decision and the accountability of the decision makers.
The close interaction of deposit insurance  and bank failure resolution  in their
effects  on market discipline and financial  fragility raises the question of institutional
interaction.  Across the  countries  with explicit  deposit  insurance  schemes  different
set-ups  can  be  observed,  ranging  from  the  deposit  insurance  agency  being  a  pure
pay-box - such as in Brazil - to deposit  insurers with broad mandates  in supervision
and  failure  resolution  - such  as  in  the  US.  Other  schemes  have  narrow  formal
powers,  but  yield  much  larger  powers  in  reality,  such  as  the  deposit  insurer  in
Germany.  More  important,  however,  than  the  institutional  setting  is  the  incentive
compatible  overall  structure  of the  financial  safety  net.  Purchase  and  assumption
techniques  can be  applied across  different  institutional  settings, as the  examples of
the US and Argentina show.
4. Three Country Studies
This  section  describes  the  financial  safety  net  arrangements  in  three
countries;  Germany,  Brazil and Russia.  These three countries do not only show very
14different  designs  in  deposit  insurance  and  bank  failure  resolution,  but  also  have
different  levels of financial,  institutional  and  economic  development  and  banking
sector structure.  While Germany and Brazil have already deposit insurance  schemes,
Russia is  currently discussing the  introducing of such a scheme.  In the following,  I
describe  and  analyze  the  different  financial  safety  net  arrangements,  taking  into
account the structure of the respective  banking system.
4.1. Germany - A Private  Solution
The  German  banking  market  comprises  three  main  sectors,  the  largest  being  the
savings banks, owned by cities, counties and  states, followed  in size by the privately
owned commercial  banks and the cooperative banks, owned by their members."4 Due
to the geographic  limitation of individual savings  and cooperative banks, competition
between the different groups of banks is much greater than between members of each
group.  While  savings  and  cooperative  banks are  not necessarily  profit-maximizing
institutions,  due  to  their  ownership  structure,  the  commercial  banks  cannot  be
assumed  to maximize  shareholder-value  either.  The  large commercial  banks vote a
large part of the votes at their respective  shareholder  meetings themselves  and there
is substantial cross-ownership  of commercial banks (Gottschalk,  1988).
The  German  fnancial  safety  net  is  largely  industry-based.  Before  the
introduction of a compulsory  deposit insurance  scheme following the adoption of a
EU mandate  in  1994, three  deposit insurance  schemes,  for cooperative,  savings and
commercial  banks,  respectively,  were completely  industry-based,  voluntary,  outside
government  supervision  and  without  government-back-up  funds.  Rather  than  the
Bundesbank, a separate  institution, the Liquidity Consortium Bank, jointly owned by
the Bundesbank  and  large  banks of all three  sectors,  provides  lender of last resort
facilities.  The  supervision  by the  Federal  Banking  Supervisory  Office  (FBSO)  is
complemented by supervision by the deposit insurance schemes and bank failures are
mostly  resolved  with  substantial  organizational  and  financial  involvement  by  the
industry.15
After the  Herstatt  crisis  in  1974,  the three  banking  groups  introduced  their
respective industry-based schemes to avoid political pressure and deeper govermnent
involvement  in  the  financial  sector.  Savings  and  cooperative  banks  have  both
regional  insurance  schemes  and  a national  compensation  scheme.  The  schemes  of
both savings  and cooperative  banks do not directly  guarantee deposits,  but rather the
15institutions  themselves,  thus offering  unlimited  depositor protection.  On top of the
deposit  insurance  scheme,  depositors  of savings  banks  are  protected  by  an  explicit
institutional guarantee of the public owners.
The  design  of Germany's  deposit  insurance  scheme  for  commercial  banks
seems at odds with some of the principles  laid down above. It is a voluntary  scheme
with a very high  coverage - all non-bank deposits are covered up to 30% of the liable
capital  of a  bank.'6 There  is  no  co-insurance  and  only  interbank  accounts,  bonds
payable  to bearer and  insider  accounts are  excluded  from  coverage.  Financing  and
management,  on  the  other  hand,  are  completely  private.  Banks  pay  an  annual
premium of 0.03% per year,  with higher premiums for banks that are perceived to be
more  risky.  The  risk  assessment  is  undertaken  by  the Auditing  Association  of the
German Bank Association but kept secret.  The premiums can be raised or set at zero,
depending on the financial situation of the deposit insurance  fund. There is no public
funding  and the Bundesbank  is prohibited  by law from functioning  as lender of last
resort to deposit insurance schemes. The deposit insurance  scheme,  organized within
the German Bank Association,  has substantial regulatory and supervisory powers vis-
a-vis  its members. The  deposit insurance scheme  gives a non-binding opinion to the
FBSO on new bank license applications. The Auditing Association of German Banks
can  impose  corrective  actions  on  member  banks  if  circumstances  indicate  an
increased  riskiness  in the  bank's business  or violations of the Banking Act  or other
laws  goveming  banks.  Penalties  may  restrict  the  volume  of deposit  business  or
particular  types of lending.  Finally,  members  may  be  expelled  from  the  scheme,
especially for missing or wrong information, and for being classified  in the worst risk
class for more than two years in a row.
With  nearly  unlimited  coverage  and  no  coinsurance,  the  German  deposit
insurance  scheme offers  little incentives  for depositors to exercise market discipline.
Monitoring  by  peer  banks  replaces  monitoring  by  depositors  in  the  German
commercial banking sector.  This is accomplished by
(i) the completely  industry-based  nature  of funding  and management  of the
scheme,
(ii) the exclusion of interbank deposits from the insurance, and
(iii) the almost complete coverage of deposits.
The  fact that  interbank  deposits  are  excluded  increases  the  incentives  for  banks  to
monitor  one  another,  while  the almost-complete  coverage of non-  bank  depositors
16seems  to  increase  market  discipline  exercised  by the  banks.1 7 Given the  complete
private nature  of the  scheme  and  the lack of public  back up  funding,  the  member
banks  cannot  expect  to  externalize  any  costs  stemming  from  a  distressed  member
bank.  The  almost-complete  coverage  therefore  increases  pressure  on  the  member
banks to monitor one another.
The  resolution  of failed  banks  is  undertaken  jointly  by  FBSO  and  banks.
Cooperative and savings banks enjoy the institutional  support of other banks in their
respective  groups.  The resolution  of commercial  banks  is mostly  done  in informal
cooperation  between FBSO and bank creditors of the troubled banks. The resolution
of Schroder,  MUnchmeyer,  Hengst and Co (SMH)  in  1983,  a small private  bank,  is
an  example  of such  cooperation.  Under  pressure  from  the  Bundesbank  and  the
Federal Banking Supervisory  Office,  banks with outstanding claims on SMH agreed
to  convert their claims  into subordinated  debt,  in exchange  for managerial  control.
The  deposit  insurance  scheme  stepped  in  to  compensate  depositors  and  foreign
creditors.  A month later,  the bank  was  split  into  a  good  and  a bad  bank,  with  the
good  bank  being  sold to Lloyds  Bank  and  the  bad  bank  being  taken  over by the
German  Bank  Association  and  liquidated.  Interestingly  enough,  the  problems  at
SMH were discovered  by the Bank Association,  not by the Supervisory  Office,  and
the German Bank Association stood at the center of the rescue.'8
The private  character of the German  financial  safety net has  its roots  in the
structure  of the  German  banking  system.  Both  deposit  insurance  and  bank  failure
resolution  of commercial  banks  are  completely  integrated  in the  German  Banking
Association,  the first  formally,  the  latter more  informally.  The commercial  banking
sector therefore  resembles  a club that  enforces  mutual  monitoring,  but also mutual
support. This club character also minimizes the adverse  selection problem that might
arise from the voluntary character of the deposit insurance  scheme by preventing the
exit of member  banks.'9 The  high  concentration  reinforces  the  club  character  and
allows the quick  resolution  of troubled  banks by involving  only  few large  players.
Having  separate  deposit  insurance  schemes  for  each  group  of  banks  (public,
cooperative  and  private)  reinforces  the  club-like  nature  of the  deposit  insurance
schemes by aligning the interests of individual  banks more closely.20
The  private  nature  of the  financial  safety  net reduces  agency  cost between
owners of the safety net, its managers and banks, since these three groups coincide in
the  German  case.  Unlike  in most other countries,  the taxpayer  is not the safety  net
17owner, thus eliminating potential agency problems  between  public managers  and the
taxpayers as owners of the safety net.
While  Germany  has not suffered  from  any systemic  banking  crisis or  large
bank  failure over the last 25  years - an  indication of the  success of its safety  net -
this has to be interpreted within the country's  institutional framework,  legal tradition
and  banking  structure.  The  high  level  of institutional  development  and  an  anti-
bankruptcy  bias  in Germany  can  partly  explain  the  lack of aggressive  risk taking.
The  ownership  patterns  and  the  resulting  lack  of  shareholder-value  maximizing
behavior might decrease efficiency  in the banking sector,  but might also help reduce
aggressive risk taking.
4.2. Brazil - A Financial  Safety Net in Development
The  Brazilian  financial  system is dominated  by two large  banks that are  owned by
the federal  government.  Together with the  largest three  privately-owned  banks, they
account  for  over  50%  of total  banking  system  assets.  This  contrasts  with  a  large
number of small  privately-owned  small  banks.  A recent  wave  of privatization  and
liquidation  has  reduced  the  importance  of banks  owned  by  the  Brazilian  states.
Failure of several large privately-owned  banks in the mid-1990s was resolved with a
good-bank-bad-bank  model,  with  the  Central  Bank  providing  resources  to  fill  the
balance  sheet  gap.  Subsequently,  bank  regulation  has  been  tightened  and  bank
supervision  significantly  improved.  While the Central  Bank used to be responsible
for all  four components of the financial  safety net - bank failure  resolution,  deposit
insurance,  regulation  and  supervision  and  lender of last resort  facilities  - the  1988
Constitution prohibited  the use of any public money for the protection of depositors,
prompting  the set-up of an industry-based  scheme in the wake of the  banking crisis
of the mid-1990s.21
- Many  elements  of  the  Brazilian  deposit  insurance  scheme  - Fundo  de
Garantidor  de  Creditos  (FGC)  - reflect  the  incentive  compatible  standards  as
described  above.  It was established in  1995 as a mandatory  insurance  scheme for all
deposit taking banks, with a relatively low coverage (currently around  6,000 USD, or
twice  GDP per  capita).22 There  is no co-insurance  but inter-bank,  non-resident  and
insider  deposits  were  initially  excluded.23 The  scheme  is  financed  by  premiums
assessed  on  the  banks  (currently  0.3%  per  year),  and  there  is  no  public  bank-up
funding due  to the constitutional  ban mentioned  above.  While there  are provisions
18for  increasing  premiums  in  times  of  need,  premiums  do  not  vary  according  to
riskiness  of banks.  The  statutes  mandate  a build-up  of liquid  assets  up to  5% of
covered deposits, thus making it an ex-ante scheme.  FGC is managed by the banking
industry, but under public policy guidance.24
Unlike in Germany,  the deposit insurance agency FGC is limited to a pay-box
function.  It does  not have  any involvement  in the supervision  of its member banks
and  no  role  in  the  resolution  of  failed  banks.  While  the  limited  coverage,  the
compulsory  membership  and  the  industry-based  financing  and  management  are
incentive  compatible,  reducing  problems of moral hazard,  principal-agent  problems
and adverse selection,  the  scheme  could be strengthened by an increased role of the
deposit  insurer  in  supervising  its  members  and  allowing  it  to  apply  disciplinary
measures against member banks. Finally,  while the institutional framework does  not
give  concerns  on  the  potential  abuse  of the  current  ex-ante  financing,  ex-post
contingent financing  seems more efficient, especially  in the light of very high interest
spreads in the Brazilian financial market.
The  Brazilian  deposit  insurance  scheme  has had  to  deal  mostly with  small
bank failures,  with one notable exception.  Most likely,  it has contributed to the trust
and the relative  stability  in the Brazilian  banking system  after the banking crisis in
the mid-90s, by paying out insured deposits of failed banks relatively  quickly.
The resolution of troubled  banks  in Brazil  is an extrajudicial  process,  led by
interveners  and  liquidators  appointed  by the Central  Bank.  While  the  extrajudicial
character  of bank  failure  resolution  was  introduced  to  avoid the  inefficiency  and
slowness of the judicial  insolvency  process and to benefit from the expertise of the
Central  Bank  in  the  banking  system,  the  results  have  been  disappointing.
Liquidations take very long since liquidators do not have any incentives  to terminate
the  process  rapidly  and  carry  subjective  liability  for any  of their  actions  during
liquidation.  Liquidations  are  also  hampered  by court  interventions  by  owners  and
other  stakeholders.  Given the  unlimited  priority  ranking of tax liabilities and  labor
claims,  other creditors  do not have  incentives  to press for rapid liquidation.  Most of
the  failed  banks  are  liquidated,  resulting  in  asset  decay  and  destruction  of credit
relationships.  While intervention,  a six-month  period that can  be extended  once and
during which  the bank  is  closed,  has the objective  to  save  the  bank,  it has  mostly
resulted  in  subsequent  liquidation.  Purchase  and  assumption  techniques,  that
involved  the sale of good assets and deposits to another bank, were  applied only to a
19few  large banks  during the banking  crisis of the mid-1990s.  The Central Bank took
the  leading  role  in  this  process,  identifying  purchasers  for  troubled  banks  and
providing  liquidity  support  to  fill the  balance  sheet  gap.  The  resolution  of these
banks also allowed foreign bank entry into the Brazilian financial market.
While  the  deposit  insurance  scheme  shows  many  elements  that  reduce  the
risk  of moral  hazard  and  financial  fragility,  it is not  well  linked to the  rest  of the
safety  net  and  the  deficiencies  in  the  bank  failure  resolution  system  limit  its
effectiveness  in reducing  moral  hazard  risks.  While  financing  and management  by
the banking  industry help  decrease  agency  problems  between  managers  and owners
of the scheme and help minimize risks of regulatory  and political capture,  regulatory
and supervisory  powers vis-a-vis  its  member banks  might strengthen  the scheme  in
the  long-term.  These  might  include  non-binding  recommendations  on new  bank
license  applications,  the  possibility  to  request  extraordinary  audits  of  banks  it
perceives  to  be  unsound,  and  the  power  to  exclude  members  it  perceives  as
recklessly managed.  These  are powers  similar  to the ones that the  German deposit
insurer has and  do not need the  build-up  of any  additional  supervisory  capacity,  as
the German  example  shows.25 Further,  a more extensive  role  for the deposit insurer
can be considered in the context of a reform of the bank failure resolution  system. On
the one side,  one can envisage the introduction  of a purchase and assumption  model
as  in  Argentina,  with  the  deposit  insurer  continuing  with  its  pay-box  role  and
supplying  funds  to  cover any balance  sheet gap  that  is  left  after the  separation  of
good assets and preferential  creditors  (such as insured depositors)  from the bad bank
that  is  sent to  liquidation.26 This would  imply however,  the statutory  application of
the  least-cost  criterion to avoid political  abuse of banks'  premium payments.  On the
other  side,  one can imagine  a model  closer to the  US case,  with a more substantial
role of the deposit insurer  in intervening and resolving troubled banks.
The  current  bank  failure  resolution  system  can  be  significantly  improved
upon,  by providing  for a purchase  and assumption  technique that allows the transfer
of  performing  assets  and  preferential  creditors  - including  insured  deposits  - to
another bank,  while the remaining  assets  and non-preferential  liabilities - including
shareholders'  claims  - stay behind  in  the  bank  to  be  liquidated.  This would  avoid
problems  of asset decay  and potential  contagion through  depositor  runs.  While  the
liquidation of small troubled  banks over the last couple of years, involving payout of
insured deposits by FGC,  has implied only a relatively  small  economic cost,  such  a
20purchase and assumption model would not only be more efficient for small banks but
be indispensable  for the resolution of  medium-sized  or larger banks.
4.3. Does Russia Need a  Deposit  Insurance? 27
Russia's  banking  sector  suffered  a major  set-back  in the  1998  banking  crisis. The
unilateral  restructuring  of government  debt  resulted  in  a  collapse  of the payment
system  and  depositor runs. Since  there was  no formal  deposit insurance  scheme in
place,  a large part of household  deposits  were  protected  by transfer  from privately
owned  banks  to the  government-owned  Sberbank,  the  former savings  bank.  These
new  resources  and  the  collapse  of  several  private  banks  allowed  Sberbank
subsequently  to  transform  itself  into  a  universal  bank,  building  up  a  large  loan
portfolio.  Currently,  Sberbank  dominates  the  retail  deposit  market with  over  75%
market  share  and  its assets  constitute  around  25%  of total banking  system  assets.
Many  of the  private  banks do  no function as  intermediaries,  but  limit their lending
activity to enterprises in their business groups.
The  1998  crisis  and  the  subsequent  years  have  brought to  light significant
weaknesses in the regulation and supervision of banks. The response to the crisis was
limited  to  regulatory  forbearance  and  liquidity  support  to  selected  banks  without
disclosure  of  the  criteria  with  which  these  banks  were  chosen.  Regulatory
forbearance,  while  in theory  with  the  purpose  to  relieve  pressure  from  the banks,
allowed  bank owners to strip assets and facilitated capital  flight. The dual role of the
Central Bank as owner and regulator of the largest two banks in the banking system -
Sberbank  and  Vneshtorgbank  - leads  inevitably  to  conflicts of interest.  A special
bank  restructuring  agency  (ARCO),  created  to  deal  with  the  resolution  of large
troubled banks, has had a very mixed record.  Several  of the intervened banks stayed
open  and  in  several  cases,  shareholders  and  management  could  stay  on.  The
liquidation of other banks by ARCO has been very slow.
The bank failure resolution shows significant deficiencies both in its legal and
institutional  structure  as  well  as  in  its  enforcement.  With  exception  of the  banks
referred  to  the  above-mentioned  ARCO,  the  Central  Bank  is  responsible  for
intervention and the resolution of troubled  banks. However, it was not until 1998 that
a Bank Bankruptcy Law was enacted and not until 2002 that the revocation of a bank
license  by the  Central  Bank  led  automatically to  its  liquidation.  Before  the  2002
amendment,  a court had to find a de-licensed bank to be bankrupt before liquidation
21could begin, resulting in a large number of  phantom banks. Further, the Central Bank
does  not  use  its  powers  to  intervene  sufficiently  early  in  a  troubled  bank.  The
liquidation  process  is  administered  by  a  court-appointed  liquidator  and  has  been
reported  to  be  extremely  slow  and  nontransparent.  Further,  the  legal  priority  for
household  deposits  has  often  been  ignored  in  favor  of  large  creditors  and
shareholders.
Overall,  the existing financial safety net does not seem incentive  compatible,
posing  significant  moral  hazard,  principal-agent  and  adverse  selection  problems.
Banks  are  not thoroughly  supervised  and  shareholders  not punished  in the case  of
failures,  thus  giving  them  opportunities  and  incentives  for aggressive  risk-taking.
There does not seem to be a level playing field between banks, given the dual role of
the Central Bank as regulator and owner of the largest two banks and the preferential
treatment  of  politically  well-connected  private  banks.  Late  intervention,  slow
liquidation  and partial  bail-outs  of shareholders  and  large  creditors  create  perverse
incentives.
While  there  is  currently  no  industry-wide  deposit  insurance  scheme,  the
Russian  government  is  preparing  the  introduction  of such  a scheme  in  the  near
future.  By introducing  such a scheme,  Russia hopes to increase  trust in the financial
system, develop financial  intermediation,  and thus foster economic development. It is
also  believed  that the extension  of deposit  insurance to all banks would  reduce the
competitive  advantage  that  the  state-owned  banks,  especially  the  former  savings
bank  Sberbank,  hold over  private  banks  in  attracting  retail  deposits.  The  scheme
would be compulsory  for all banks,  including Sberbank.  The proposal  provides for a
coverage  limit of 95,000  Rubles (around  3,000  USD),  which approximately  equals
GDP  per  capita,  with  a  co-insurance  of  25%  on  deposits  over  20,000  Rubles.
Coverage  would  be  limited  to  household  deposits,  but  include  both  Ruble  and
foreign-exchange  accounts.  The  scheme  would  be jointly  financed  by  premiums
assessed  on the  banks - 0.6%  on covered  deposits  - and  budget  support  from  the
government.  Management  would  be  public  and  under  guidance  from  the  Central
Bank that is also responsible  for regulating and supervising the banking  system. The
scheme  would be  reduced to a pay-box function,  without any role in supervision of
its member banks.
While the limited  coverage  of the proposed  scheme  is incentive  compatible,
the proposed  public management and joint private and public financing increases  the
22risks of political and regulatory capture and poses significant moral hazard risks. The
envisaged  ex-ante  accumulation  of  liquid  resources  invites  political  abuse  and
looting.  The  lack  of any  regulatory  and  supervisory  powers  vis-a-vis  its  member
banks deprives  the deposit  insurer of any means  of minimizing insurance  losses by
imposing  market  discipline  on banks,  while  the availability  of back-up  funding  by
the government decreases the incentives to do so.
Given  the  extremely  weak  supervisory  and  regulatory  framework  and
deficiencies  in the  bank  failure  resolution  system,  the  introduction  of a  deposit
insurance scheme  at this stage seems premature.  The lack of serious supervision and
prompt supervisory action means that such a scheme would pose a high risk of moral
hazard  to  the  system.  In  the  absence  of  the  necessary  market  and  regulatory
discipline, the increased  ability that an insurance scheme  would give to private banks
to  attract  additional  resources  would  be  likely  to  encourage  those  banks  to  lend
aggressively and imprudently.
While  a  deposit  insurance  scheme  has  been  proposed  to  level  the  playing
field  between  government-owned  and  privately  owned  banks,  the  effect  of the
deposit  insurance scheme  on the relative competitive  position of government-owned
vis-a-vis  private  banks  depends  on a hard-budget  constraint  being  imposed  on the
government-owned  banks, so that they price risk correctly and function according to
fully commercial  terms.
S.  Co¢nncusionis
This paper discusses the incentive  compatible design of deposit insurance and
bank failure resolution,  in the context of the overall financial safety net. An incentive
compatible design has to address problems of moral hazard - inherent  incentives for
banks  to  take  aggressive  risks  -,  principal-agent  problems  between  owners  and
managers  of the  financial  safety  as  well  as  the  banks  and  problems  of adverse
selection  of banks.  Limited  coverage,  industry-based  funding and  management  and
compulsory  membership  can  reduce  moral  hazard,  principal-agent  and  adverse
selection problems in deposit insurance schemes. Prompt intervention and wiping out
equity  and  potentially  claims  of  large  creditors,  significant  financial  and
organizational  involvement of banking sector in the resolution of troubled banks  and
equal  treatment  of all  banks  can  minimize  these  risk  in  bank  failure  resolution
23systems.  The  effectiveness  of deposit  insurance  and  bank  failure  resolution  in
reducing  the  risk  of  financial  fragility  does  not  only  depend  on  the  incentive-
compatible  structure  of each,  but also  on the effective  interaction of both.  Purchase
and assumption techniques exemplify the close interdependence of both, but also the
tensions.
The  analysis  of the  financial  safety  nets  in  Germany,  Brazil  and  Russia
underlines  the  importance  of analyzing  the  whole  financial  safety net,  taking  into
account  the  structure  of  the  banking  system-  and  the  level  of  institutional
development,  when assessing deposit  insurance schemes  and bank  failure resolution
systems. The structure of the German banking system facilitates a financial  safety net
with  a  completely  private  deposit  insurance  scheme  and  a  bank failure  resolution
scheme that relies heavily on financial and organizational  support  from other banks.
While  the  Brazilian  deposit  insurance  scheme  is incentive  compatible  along many
dimensions,  it  is  not well  integrated  into  the  overall  financial  safety  net,  and  the
current  system  of  bank  failure  resolution  that  consists  mainly  of  liquidation  is
inefficient  and inadequate  for failure of medium and  large  banks. The Russian  bank
failure  resolution  system,  finally,  gives  perverse  incentives  to  bank  owners  and
managers,  by  intervening too  late  and  often  in  favor of shareholder  and managers
who  have taken the decisions  that  led to the  fragility in the  first place.  Given  these
deficiencies  and  a  weak  supervisory  and  institutional  framework,  the  proposed
introduction of a deposit insurance  scheme  seems a risky undertaking  that will most
probably increase the probability of financial fragility rather than reducing it.
Since a country's financial safety net has to be adapted to a country's level of
institutional  development and banking structure,  one can certainly not simply export
Germany's  private  solution to  other, especially  developing,  countries.  However,  one
can  learn  certain  lessons.  First,  embedding the  financial  safety  net and  its different
components  in  the  banking  community  can  reduce  principal-agent  problems  by
making  banks the  managers  and  owners  of the  safety  net.  Second,  assessing  risk-
based premiums based on auditing by the deposit insurer itself helps align incentives
of banks and deposit  insurer and thus minimize  moral hazard  risk. Finally,  while  a
completely  private  solution  might  not  be  possible,  especially  in the  case  of  a
systemic  crisis,  a  private-public  partnership  that -relies  on  a  completely  industry-
based solution for non-systemic crises can reduce  risks to the financial  safety net.  A
legal  prohibition  of public  depositor  protection,  as  in  the  cases  of Germany  and
24Brazil, not only forces banks to bear the cost of deposit protection,  but can also force
them to actively participate in bank failure resolution, as the German case shows.
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Juan, undated).
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(2002).
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monitoring and disciplining,  working better with a small number of banks.
21  See Lundberg (1999) for a historic and technical overview over the Brazilian
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